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Under  the  conditions  prevalent  in  the  late  Pleistocene  epoch  (small
hunter-gatherer groups and frequent inter-group conflicts),  coevolution
of  gene-related  behavior  and  culturally  transmitted  group-level  institu-
tions provides a plausible explanation for the parochial altruistic and re-
ciprocator  traits  of  most  modern  humans.  When,  with  the  agricultural
revolution,  societies  became  larger  and  more  complex,  the  collective
nature  of  the  monitoring  and  punishment  of  norm  violators  was  no
longer effective. This led to the emergence of new institutions of gover-
nance and social hierarchies. The transition from an egalitarian society
and the acceptance of the new institutions may have been possible only
if,  in the majority of the population, the reciprocator trait had become
an internalized norm. However, the new ruling class has its own dynam-
ics, which in turn may lead to a new social crisis. Using a simple model
inspired by previous work by Bowles and Gintis, these effects are stud-
ied here. 
1. Introduction
It is a fact that humans are a highly cooperative species. Cooperative
in  helping  each  other,  cooperative  in  achieving  material  and  intellec-
tual achievements unmatched by other species, but also cooperative in
war and genocide. From the biological point of view, human coopera-
tion is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, humans cooper-
ate with genetically unrelated individuals, with people they will never
meet  again,  and  when reputation  gains  are  small  or  absent,  even  en-
gaging in altruistic punishment of defectors. These patterns of cooper-
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ation  cannot  be  explained  by  kin  selection,  signaling  theory,  or
reciprocal  altruism.  The  idea  that  group  selection  might  explain  this
behavior  goes  back  to  Darwin  himself  who,  in  chapter  5  of  the
Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, states that “... an in-
crease  in  the  number  of  well-endowed  men  and  an  advancement  in
the standard of morality will  certainly give an immense advantage of
one tribe over another.” However, this idea fell into disrepute because
evolution  does  not  pitch  groups  against  groups,  nor  individuals
against individuals, but genes against genes. A “selfish gene” analysis
makes  the  altruistic  good-of-the-group  outcome  virtually  impossible
to achieve, in particular because the late Pleistocene groups of modern
man were not believed to be sufficiently different genetically to favor
group selection. Therefore, human cooperation remained an evolution-
ary puzzle. 
In  recent  years  S.  Bowles,  H.  Gintis,  and  collaborators  [1–4]  re-
vived the group selection idea by showing that the particular environ-
ment  and  type  of  the  hunter-gatherer  groups  of  the  late  Pleistocene
(which corresponds to about 95% of the evolutionary time of modern
man) were such that a multilevel evolutionary dynamic involving gene-
culture coevolution could account for the development of the coopera-
tive  altruistic  trait  they  call  “strong  reciprocity.”  The  cost  of  group
beneficial  behavior  to  an  individual  would  be  limited  by  the  emer-
gence of group-level social norms. On the other hand, even in the ab-
sence  of  these  group-level  norms,  group  selection  pressures  would
support  the evolution of the cooperative-altruistic  punishment trait  if
intergroup  conflicts  were  very  frequent.  Egalitarian  practices  among
ancestral  humans reduced the force of individual selection against al-
truists,  while  frequent  warfare  made  altruistic  cooperation  among
group  members  essential  to  survival.  That  is,  parochial  altruism  and
warfare  could  have  coevolved.  Furthermore,  they  developed  simple
mathematical models that gave quantitative support to their ideas. 
We think that the analysis of Bowles and Gintis provides a convinc-
ing  picture  of  the  genesis  of  the  cooperative  nature  of  humans  and
their  culture.  The  human  capacity  for  social  norm  building  and  for
the cultural transmission of learned behavior allowed altruistic other-
regarding preferences to proliferate. But it also suggests that the other-
regarding preferences that we inherited from primeval man are partly
cultural,  not purely genetic,  and therefore liable to change at a much
faster  pace  than  if  they  were  purely  genetic.  A  natural  question  is
what  is  happening  to  this  human  trait  (that  presumably  developed
during  a  period  of  190 000  years)  in  the  short  time  (10 000  years)
since the end of the Pleistocene. Using a simple version of the Bowles–
Gintis model, the evolution of the reciprocator trait has been analyzed
in  [5],  in  a  situation  where  the  size  of  the  society  and  the  degree  of
clustering  precludes  the  collective  nature  of  rule  violator  monitoring.
Both  an  agent-based  and  a  mean-field  model  were  used.  The  main
conclusion was that in this situation, the reciprocator trait would not
be evolutionary stable. 
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Historically,  it  is  known  that  such  a  transition  from  the  small
hunter-gatherer  groups  to  larger  sedentary  population  groups  occur-
red at the time of the agricultural revolution and that the solution was
“the  emergence  of  government.”  That  is,  new types  of  agents  (rulers
and authorities) came into play and replaced the type of egalitarian de-
cision-making that might have existed before. It is worth noticing that
the final, if difficult [6–8], acceptance of this transition of power may
have to do with the internalization of the reciprocator trait, which val-
ued the enforcing of social norms above complete freedom. 
In  the  agricultural  societies,  specialization  arose  as  well  as  new
security  needs  and  more  intense  population  pressure  on  limited  re-
sources. This tended to produce greater organization within the com-
munity, which in turn led to social hierarchies, certain forms of chief-
tainship, and a whole class of people with managing roles. 
In this paper, using a setting similar to the one in [5], we will study
the  effect  of  introducing  in  the  model  a  new  agent  representing  the
role  of  the  authorities.  The  collective  monitoring  and  punishment  of
the reciprocators  will  be  a  decreasing function of  the  population size
in the social group, which is allowed to grow with the average fitness.
The  need  to  introduce  authority  agents  to  avoid  a  “tragedy  of  the
commons,” that is, a fitness crisis arising from the proliferation of self-
regarding agents, is an expected effect: the emergence of government.
The  interesting  question  is  that  the  dynamics  of  the  authority  agents
may, by themselves, lead to a new fitness crisis called a “tragedy of au-
thorities.” This crisis may or may not be related to the elite overpro-
duction  crisis  that  some  authors  [9–11]  have  identified.  This  will  be
discussed in Section 3. 
2. Emergence of Government and the Tragedy of Authorities
The basic setting is similar to the one used before [2, 5] as far as the
type  of  “public  good  activity”  is  concerned  in  a  group  of  N  agents,
with N being in general a function of time. Here, however, three types
of  agents  are  considered.  The  first  type  (R  agents)  are  cooperators
that also have a monitoring effect on the cooperation of other agents.
The  second  are  self-regarding  agents  (S  agents)  and  the  third  are
purely monitoring agents (A agents). The labels that were chosen refer
to  the  name  reciprocators  (R),  self-regarding  or  shirkers  (S),  and  au-
thorities (A). The percentages of each one of the types in the popula-
tion are denoted by fR, fS, and fA.
Each R or S agent can produce a maximum amount of goods q  at
cost b (with goods and costs in fitness units). An S agent benefits from
shirking public good work by decreasing the cost of effort bHsL, s be-
ing the fraction of time the agent shirks. As before, the following con-
ditions hold:
(1)bH0L ! b, bH1L ! 0, b£HsL < 0, b££HsL > 0.
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Furthermore, qH1 - sL > bHsL so that, at every level of effort, working
helps  the  group  more  than  it  hurts  the  worker.  This  assumption,
which restricts the class of “cost of effort” functions, also emphasizes
the  fact  that  it  is  desirable  to  explore  a  situation  where  cooperation
may  in  the  end  be  beneficial  for  everyone.  Otherwise,  cooperation
would be pointless.
For bHsL,
(2)bHsL ! 2
2s - 1 + 1 + 4 ê b - 21 + 1 + 4 ê b
is chosen [1], which satisfies the constraints in equation (1).
R  agents  never  shirk  and  punish  each  free  rider  at  cost  cs  and
probability  pHNL,  the  cost  being  shared  by  all  R  agents.  For  an  S
agent,  the  estimated  cost  of  being  punished  is  ss,  punishment  being
ostracism  or  some  other  fitness  decreasing  measure.  Punishment  and
cost of punishment are proportional to the shirking time s, c is the re-
ciprocator unit of punishment cost, and s  is the weight given by an S
agent  to  the  possibility  of  being  punished.  It  may  or  may  not  be  the
same  as  the  actual  fitness  costs  of  punishment  (g, gA).  Each  S  agent
chooses s (the shirking time fraction) to minimize the function 
(3)BHsL ! bHsL + sHfR + fALs - qH1 - sL 1
N
.
From the point of view of an S agent HfR + fALs  is  the probability of
being  monitored  and  punished.  The  last  term  is  the  agent’s  share  of
his own production. The value sS that minimizes BHsL is
(4)
sS !
max min
1
2
-
1
4
+
1
b
+
1
s HfR + fAL + q ê N , 1 , 0 .
The contribution of each species to the population in the next time
period is proportional to its fitness pR, pS, or pA, computed from 
(5)
pR
£ ! q H1 - fA - fS sSL x - b - c p HNL fS N sSN fR
pS
£ ! q H1 - fA - fS sSL x - b HsSL - Hg p HNL fR + gA fALsS
pA
£ ! q H1 - fA - fS sSLw x - cA fS N sSN fA
and  pR,S,A ! max IpR,S,A£ , 0M  because  the  baseline  fitness  is  zero.  No-
tice  that  although  we  are  using  notions  like  fitness  and  evolutionary
stability  borrowed  from  genetic  evolution  throughout  the  paper,  we
are in fact dealing mostly with cultural processes.
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The first term in pR
£ , pS
£ , and pA
£  is the benefit arising from the pro-
duced public goods. The factors x and w x with 
x !
1
w fA + 1 - fA
account  for  the  fact  that  this  benefit  is  the  same  for  R  and  S  agents
but might be different for A agents. The second term in pR
£  and pS
£  is
the work effort. The third term in pR
£  and the second term in pA
£  repre-
sent  the  fitness  cost  of  punishment  for  R and A agents  and the  third
term  in  pS
£  represents  the  cost  incurred  by  S  agents  when  they  are
punished.
The g and gA  coefficients code for the severity of the coercive mea-
sures affecting the fitness of S agents. The last term in pR
£  and pA
£  em-
phasizes  the  heavy  punishing  burden  put  on  R  or  A  agents  when  in
small numbers. The factor pHNL, a decreasing function of N, accounts
for  the  fact  that  (as  studied  at  length  in  [5]),  when  a  social  group
grows  in  size,  the  collective  nature  of  monitoring  of  free  riders  be-
comes  increasingly  difficult.  Essentially,  the  punishment  probability
by R agents should be a growing function of the clustering coefficient
of the group. Here, for illustration purposes, a simple function of N is
chosen:
pHNL ! 1 + d
1 + d HN ê N0L ,
with N0 being some small initial population.
Finally,  for  the  evolution  of  the  population  at  successive  genera-
tions, a replicator map is chosen:
(6)fa, new ! fa
PaHf L
fR PS + fS PS + fA PA
a ! R, S, A.
A different, incremental dynamic is sometimes used for the fitness-
based  evolution  of  populations.  The  replicator  map  used  here  pro-
vides  faster  evolution  but  qualitatively  similar  results,  up  to  a  renor-
malization of the time scale.
First  the  dynamics  of  R  and  S  agents  are  studied  alone,  keeping
fA ! 0.  In  this  case,  using  equations  (4)  and  (5),  the  evolution  of
fR ! 1 - fS  corresponds  to  a  one-dimensional  map  that  is  illustrated
in  Figure  1  for  two  values  of  pHNL  (1.0  and  0.5).  For  pHNL ! 1,  the
map  has  an  unstable  fixed  point  at  A  (fRHAL > 0.57),  a  left-stable
fixed  point  at  B  (fRHBL > 0.85),  and  a  continuum  of  neutral  fixed
points  after  that.  For  pHNL ! 0.5,  only  the  neutral  fixed  points  re-
main. The  neutral  fixed  points  correspond  to  the  situation  where  S
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agents  do not  shirk  for  fear  of  being  punished.  For  initial  conditions
smaller than fRHAL in the first case or fRHBL in the second, the popula-
tion of R agents is always invaded by S agents. However, the neutral-
ity  of  the  fixed  points  means  that  the  population  of  S  agents  is  not
completely invaded by the R agents.
Figure 1. One-dimensional map of the evolution of R agents corresponding to
fA ! 0, q ! 2, b ! 1, c ! 0.1, g ! 4, s ! 3, and N ! 20.
Next,  still  keeping  fA ! 0,  the  evolution  of  the  population  of  R
and S agents is studied when the population increases in time accord-
ing to a global fitness-dependent law, chosen as 
NHt + 1L ! NHtL ebp,
where p ! ⁄a fa pa.
Figure  2  displays  the  results  for  a  time  evolution  starting  from
N0 ! 20,  fR ! 0.7,  and  fS ! 0.3.  In  the  upper-left  plot,  the  percent-
ages  fR,  fS,  and  fA  (fA ! 0  in  this  case)  of  each  agent  type  are  dis-
played as the distances to the three sides of a triangle. As long as the
population (N) remains small, the monitoring effects of R agents con-
trols shirking (s) by the S agents and, as a result, their percentage (fR)
and fitness (PR) increases, as well as the average fitness of the group.
However, with further population growth the punishment probability
(pHNL) of shirkers decreases, leading for a while to a higher degree of
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shirking  (s)  and  higher  fitness  (PS)  and  percentage  (fS)  of  S  agents.
But because S agents with high s produce much less goods, the fitness
of all agents finally decreases and the group collapses. This is the well-
known tragedy of  the commons,  here induced by the fact  that  moni-
toring of the public good behavior of the agents cannot be a fully col-
lective activity in a large society. 
Figure 2. Time  evolution  of  R  and  S  agents  with  fA ! 0,  q ! 2,  b ! 1,
c ! 0.1, g ! 4, s ! 3, and N0 ! 20.
It  is  then  natural  that  a  population  group  whose  success  is  based
on  cooperation  and  control  of  selfish  behavior  would  recognize  the
need, beyond a certain population level, to assign the control and pun-
ishing role to specialized agents with extra power and authority. This
is  called  the  emergence  of  government.  The  model  now  starts  from
the  same  initial  conditions,  but  when  fR  reaches  a  value  below  0.5,
the dynamics of A agents are unfrozen, imposing for the moment the
constraint  that  fA  should  not  exceed  0.2  and,  to  isolate  the  effect  of
the A agents, the population is assumed to be constant after that mo-
ment. The result is shown in Figure 3. 
The  outcome  is  rather  satisfactory.  After  the  unfreezing  of  the  fA
dynamics,  the  percentage  of  R  agents  still  decreases  for  a  while,  but
then it starts to grow and the group stabilizes at a high level of aver-
age fitness. 
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Figure 3. Time  evolution  with  the  three  types  of  agents  but  fA § 0.2  (q ! 2,
b ! 1, c ! 0.1, s ! 3, cA ! 0.45, g ! 4, and gA ! 11).
Notice  that  the  growth  of  the  number  of  A  agents  is  rather  fast.
The reason is that as soon as they start controlling the behavior of the
S agents,  both s  and fS  decrease.  This greatly increases the fitness of
the  A agents,  because  they  benefit  from the  goods  produced  without
incurring  the  cost  of  control  because  there  is  almost  nothing  to  con-
trol anymore. If the 0.2 bound is now removed on fA (Figure 4), the A
agents’  population  continues  to  grow  but,  because  they  produce  no
goods,  the  average  fitness  finally  decreases  to  zero  as  the  group  col-
lapses. This is a crisis of a different type called the tragedy of authori-
ties.  What  this  means  for  actual  societies  will  be  discussed  in  Sec-
tion!3. 
A very similar effect is obtained if, while keeping fA  bounded, w is
allowed  to  grow  with  the  fitness  of  A  agents,  that  is,  allowing  the
share of goods allotted to A agents to grow. It may also happen that
with the  introduction of  the  authority  agents  they may,  for  example,
demand an increase in public works for their benefit, essentially equiv-
alent  to  a  change  of  the  bHsL  cost  of  effort  function.  However,  the
qualitative effects would not be changed with perhaps an even earlier
tragedy of authorities outcome. 
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Figure 4. Time  evolution  with  the  three  types  of  agents  and  fA  allowed  to
grow  above  0.2  after  time  500  (q ! 2,  b ! 1,  c ! 0.1,  s ! 3,  cA ! 0.45,
g ! 4, and gA ! 11).
A conclusion is that a stable society with government is only possi-
ble if the tragedy of authorities is avoided. To illustrate this effect, in
our model  we have imposed an artificial  cut  off  on the number of  A
agents.  In  real  life,  a  similar  limitation  may  be  obtained  by  internal
competition of the A agents themselves.  
Here  we  would  only  like  to  emphasize  the  delicate  nature  of  the
balance  between  the  several  agents  in  a  viable  society  and  the  emer-
gence of what seem to be universal features in the human social evolu-
tion.  Cooperation  is  at  the  root  of  success  in  human  groups.  How-
ever,  a  natural,  perhaps  biological,  tendency  of  humans  to  minimize
effort and to maximize benefits requires that a certain amount of con-
trol  of  shirking  is  required.  This  led  some  humans  to  internalize  the
idea that  shirkers  should be controlled.  Apparently,  it  is  the  societies
where more humans adopted this norm that were the most successful.
When,  after  the  agricultural  revolution,  the  human  groups  became
larger, collective control became more difficult. Then, the evolved ac-
ceptance  of  social  norms  led  naturally  to  the  acceptance  of  govern-
ment  as  a  specialized  body.  However,  the  dynamic  of  the  authority
agents may, by itself, lead to a new fitness crisis. 
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3. Remarks and Conclusions
Stylized  mathematical  models,  both  in  natural  and  human  sciences,
are not intended to take care of all the details that each particular sys-
tem possesses. Rather, they are intended to extract general features or
universal  mechanisms,  if  any,  that  rule  the  dynamics  of  the  system.
Then, of course, the detailed characteristics that each physical system
or society has will  determine the time scales and intensity of the uni-
versal features.
The important point to retain is that the general behavior extracted
from the  simple  equations  (5)  and  (6)  is  qualitatively  the  same  for  a
large range of parameter values. Hence, the general features that may
be extracted from this and previous works are as follows.
1) Under the conditions prevalent in the late Pleistocene (i.e., small
population  groups,  frequent  inter-group  conflicts,  and  a  species  with
the  capacity  for  norm enforcing  and  cultural  transmission  of  learned
behavior),  the  reciprocator  trait  may  become  dominant  although,  in
general,  not  completely  invasive  of  the  self-regarding  type.  In  fact,
recent results in experimental games seem to indicate the existence of
diverse subpopulations even now (defectors that always defect and co-
operators that always cooperate, as well as consistently tit-for-tat indi-
viduals). 
2)  In a large population,  monitoring of  public  good behavior can-
not  be  a  fully  collective  activity,  rather  being  the  chore  of  those  in
close contact with the free riders. Because punishment of free riders re-
quires a local consensus among reciprocators, the clustering nature of
the society would play an important role in the maintenance and evo-
lution  of  the  reciprocator  trait.  Although  large  human  societies  tend
to  be  “small  worlds”  in  the  sense  of  short  path  lengths,  they  do  not
necessarily maintain a high degree of clustering. Therefore, norm mon-
itoring and enforcing requires new special  institutions of  governance.
However,  the  new  institutions  bring  with  them  social  hierarchies,
which  imply  inequalities.  Therefore,  acceptance  of  the  new  institu-
tions  may  have  been  possible  only  if,  in  the  majority  of  the  popula-
tion, the reciprocator trait had become an internalized norm. 
3)  The  evolutionary  dynamics  of  the  agents  associated  to  gover-
nance, that is, the ruling class, may by its proliferation or by assigning
to itself  a higher share of the production (a high w  factor in the Sec-
tion  2  model)  provoke  a  decrease  of  the  average  fitness,  a  crisis,  or
even  a  collapse  of  the  society.  This  is  what  has  been  called  here  the
tragedy  of  authorities.  Some  authors  [9–11]  have  studied  the  histor-
ical  effects  of  “elite  overproduction”  as  generating  crisis  and  revolu-
tions.  However,  not  all  cases  of  elite  overproduction  that  they
characterize  can  be  identified  with  the  phenomena  of  the  tragedy  of
authorities. If elite overproduction is, for example, the proliferation of
an aristocratic class that, under the protection of the ruler, lives from
the  society  production  without  contributing  to  it,  then  it  has  all  the
marks of a tragedy of authorities. But if, instead, elite overproduction
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is  associated  with  a  higher  access  of  the  youth  to  higher  education,
this is not a tragedy of authorities. The eventual crisis that may occur
in this case results from the fact that the new educated agents are not
incorporated either  in  the  productive  sector  or  as  beneficiaries  of  the
society  production.  Hence,  it  is  not  a  tragedy  of  authorities.  In  fact,
they  are  only  reacting  against  an  authority  structure  that  wants  to
preserve their privileges; therefore, to associate these two distinct situ-
ations  under  the  same  elite  overproduction  label  may  be  quite  mis-
leading. 
As shown in Section 2,  the existence of  authority  agents  is  benefi-
cial to society as long as their number and their share of the goods re-
mains  limited.  The  problem  is  the  old  question  of  “who  guards  the
guardians” [12]. Democracy is in principle a way to implement limita-
tions and accountability of the rulers. But even then, nothing is guar-
anteed. Economic power easily escapes constraints of democratic con-
trol.  And  even  more  subtle  effects  may  occur.  For  example,  through
exploration  of  the  co-evolved  parochial  feelings  of  the  population,  it
is easy to erect as a goal the proliferation of local or regional govern-
ment  structures,  coordinating  committees,  and  layers  and  layers  of
control when there is nothing else to control. 
Another  example  may  be  found  in  [13],  where  it  is  shown  how
well-organized  groups  can  use  seemingly  irrational  government  poli-
cies to exploit  poorly organized groups. Given rational predatory be-
havior  between  these  groups,  protection  or  any  other  redistributive
policy that improves the chances of election of a party increases politi-
cal efficiency. This can create an economic black hole, conditions un-
der which an entire economy can disappear into lobbying. 
4)  Even  subtler  effects  of  emergent  tragedies  of  authorities  are
found everywhere.  The solidary form of collective government of  the
hunter-gatherer groups was probably the most successful invention of
modern  man,  leading  to  his  dominance  over  other  species  and  even
over other hominids. It was also the most extensively tested of all, last-
ing for 95% of the evolutionary history of modern man. Centralized,
professional  forms  of  government,  by  comparison,  are  a  very  recent
development and not always very successful. Hence, it could be ratio-
nally  expected  that,  whenever  applicable,  “community  government”
would  be  used.  In  fact,  except  in  very  rare  cases,  this  is  not  so.  In-
stead, centralized forms of government tend to migrate to all local lev-
els  carrying with them the kind of  political  party-oriented issues that
are not necessarily the most relevant at the local community level. 
5)  Evolutionary stability  of  the  reciprocator  trait  is  very  much de-
pendent on social norms and transmission of culture; it is a trait that
depends  as  much  on  genetics  as  on  culture.  Some  direct  evidence  of
this  comes  from  the  fact  that  experimental  games  played  by  adults
and  young  children  have  different  results.  Culturally  inherited  traits
may have a much faster dynamic than gene-based ones. If the recipro-
cator  trait  has  a  high  cultural  component, it  is  critical  to  understand
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how modern society  might  be  acting  on or  modifying  it.  A consider-
able loss of cooperative behavior might change society in many unex-
pected  ways.  Could  less  altruism  come  along  with  less  hostility  to
strangers? If contemporary man were becoming more like Homo eco-
nomicus,  maybe  it  would  not  be  necessary  to  rewrite  the  classical
economy books. 
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